Since the outbreak of the war between Ukraine and Russia, the role of drones on the battlefield has changed drastically. Where unmanned systems used to be deployed mainly for reconnaissance, they have now grown into massively used attack weapons. Both Russia and Ukraine deploy thousands of drones, ranging from small observation UAVs to one-way attack drones such as the Iranian Shahed. These drones are relatively cheap, can travel hundreds of kilometres and carry explosive charges that can cause considerable damage to infrastructure and civilian targets.
This has exposed a fundamental problem within existing air defence. Many air defence missiles are designed to shoot down aircraft or helicopters and often cost many hundreds of thousands of euros each. Using such missiles against drones that sometimes cost only a few tens of thousands of euros is hardly sustainable economically. In prolonged conflicts, this leads to a skewed cost balance in which the defender is structurally worse off than the attacker.
Video below: Frankenburg tests the Mark 1 missile against a Shahed-like drone.
The Shahed as a strategic weapon
The Shahed drones used by Russia show why this development is so worrying. They are slow and relatively simply built, but can fly low, are hard to detect and carry a heavy warhead. Precisely because they are cheap, they can be used in large numbers. That forces countries to think about alternatives to classic air defence.
It is therefore no coincidence that both the United States and France are working on their own drones that closely resemble the Shahed concept. Not only to be able to use them, but also to understand them better and counter them more effectively. The focus is shifting more and more to mass production, simplicity and low cost — on both the attack and the defence side.
Mark I: small, fast and cheap
In that context, the Mark I missile from Estonian company Frankenburg Technologies attracts attention. This missile has been developed specifically for short-range air defence against drones. Its size is particularly striking: with a length of only 650 millimetres, the Mark I is extremely compact compared with traditional air defence missiles.
Yet the system is anything but slow. Thanks to a solid-fuel rocket motor, the Mark I reaches speeds of more than 1,000 kilometres per hour. This allows it to intercept targets at up to about 2 kilometres. That makes the missile extremely suitable for shooting down low and slow-flying drones, such as Shahed-like systems, but also faster jet-powered targets.
The missile is launched from a simple tripod set-up and uses external sensors and command & control systems for detection and target tracking. In the terminal phase, terminal guidance ensures the missile gets close enough to the target to detonate via a proximity fuse.
Image Frankenburg: clearly showing how small this missile is.
Cost as the decisive factor
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Mark I is its price. Frankenburg says the missile is about ten times cheaper than a Stinger missile. That is precisely what makes the system attractive for countries that want to arm themselves against drone swarms without burning through their defence budget.
The Mark I is designed with mass production as its starting point. The use of commercially available components should make it possible to produce the missiles quickly and locally, including in countries that want to scale up their own air defence. In this way, Frankenburg responds to a growing need for “sovereign production”: weapons that do not depend on long international supply chains.
Interest and ambitions
Frankenburg now has several partnerships and test programmes running in Europe and beyond. The company explicitly positions the Mark I not as a replacement for existing air defence systems, but as a supplement in the lowest layer of air defence. Exactly where cheap drones are the biggest problem.
The ultimate goal is clear: making air defence affordable again in an era in which mass has become more important than perfection. The war in Ukraine has shown that whoever can hold out longest is often decisive. Systems such as the Mark I fit that reality — not as a high-end wonder weapon, but as a pragmatic answer to a new, persistent threat.
