China has concluded a striking arms deal with Egypt for the delivery of ten WJ-700 combat drones. The agreement stands out because Egypt traditionally relies heavily on American military equipment, including F-16 fighter jets and American air defence systems. The choice of an advanced Chinese drone system underlines how countries increasingly balance between great powers and deliberately spread their defence partners strategically.
The deal fits into a broader power struggle between China and the United States, in which arms exports have become an important geopolitical instrument. Where Washington has historically built its influence through NATO, bilateral security treaties and arms deliveries with political conditions, China opts for a more pragmatic approach: fast delivery, relatively low costs and few explicit political demands.

What kind of drone is the WJ-700?
The WJ-700 is not a classic turboprop drone like many earlier Chinese models, but a jet-powered unmanned combat aircraft. It can stay in the air for up to about twenty hours, operates at high altitude and has a maximum payload of about 800 kilograms of weapons or sensors. This puts the WJ-700 in a class closer to light jet fighters than to traditional MALE drones (Medium Altitude Long Endurance).
The drone is designed for several roles: long-endurance reconnaissance, electronic warfare and precision strikes. Thanks to its speed and altitude, it can attack targets that are better protected against slower drones. Anti-ship missions and taking out radar and air defence systems are also among its tasks. For countries without access to Western stealth aircraft, the WJ-700 thus offers an attractive alternative.
The exact number of WJ-700s produced has not been made public, but the system is still in a relatively early export phase. Algeria is considered the first foreign user, and Egypt now appears to be the second. That indicates China is deliberately positioning this type of drone as a high-end export product.

Who is buying Chinese weapons now?
Over the past ten years, China has become a fixture on the global arms market. Chinese weapons are widespread especially in Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia. Countries such as Pakistan, Algeria, Nigeria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore and Myanmar have been using Chinese drones, missiles, armoured vehicles and air defence systems for years.
Chinese drones in particular have gained ground internationally. Models such as the Wing Loong and CH series are in use in dozens of countries and have also been used operationally. For many states they are an alternative to American or Israeli drones, which often fall under strict export rules. China thus fills a gap in the market that Western countries partly created themselves.
Pakistan is by far the most important customer and strategic partner. The country receives a large share of China’s arms exports, including fighter jets, drones and missile systems. Pakistan thus functions as a kind of anchor point of Chinese military influence in South Asia.
More than just drones
Drone exports do not stand alone. China also supplies tanks, artillery, air defence systems, training aircraft and naval ships to a variety of countries. In addition, defence deals are often combined with economic cooperation, infrastructure projects and technology transfer. That approach fits China’s broader strategy of building long-term dependencies, similar to how the United States did for decades through military alliances and joint exercises.
In regions around China itself — such as Southeast Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East — this approach is becoming ever more visible. Arms deliveries serve there as a gateway to political influence, military cooperation and strategic presence.
Power politics in a new form
The Egyptian WJ-700 deal shows that the world order is becoming less and less black and white. Countries no longer automatically choose one camp, but put their own interests first. For China, that is an opportunity to slowly but surely expand its sphere of influence, not through formal alliances like NATO, but through a network of partners dependent on Chinese technology and deliveries.
























